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  This paper tests empirically the performance of three structural models of corporate bond 
pricing, namely Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000). While the first 
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The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  test  empirically  the  performance  of  three  structural  models  of 
corporate debt pricing: those of Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), 
using a sample of 50 bond prices from firms with simple capital structures, during the period 
2001–04. In the case of Fan and Sundaresan (2000) we calibrate particularly its debt-equity 
swap model
1. With the analysis of prediction errors we evaluate how well these models fit bond 
prices and credit spreads. We believe that this is important because it allows for a discussion of 
some  “real  world  features”  that  are  not  captured  by  these  models.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
comparison of the results of the three models allows us to determine the extent to which some 
innovations in the models have improved the pricing of risky bonds. We refer specifically to the 
possibility of early default, coupons, taxes and bankruptcy costs when we compare the Merton 
(1974) model with the Leland (1994) model and the effect of negotiation features when we 
compare the Leland (1994) model with the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) model. 
  Moreover, we evaluate whether there are differences in the performance of the models 
dependent on rating and maturity of the bonds or on asset volatility and sector of the firms. This 
analysis is important because previous empirical studies in the field have not been conclusive: 
while Ericsson and Reneby (2002) report a worst performance of their structural model for 
speculative grade bonds, Eom et al. (2004) do not confirm this pattern in their sample.  
  Even considering relevant the analysis of rating, maturity and asset volatility effects, the 
study of a sector or industry effect is probably more important as there is very little empirical 
evidence regarding this issue, and we believe that the study of a sector effect in the performance 
of the structural models is one of the main contributions of this paper. If we detect any sector 
effect, then it will be interesting to analyse which sector characteristics might explain a better or 
worst performance of the models. We might have models that perform better in some sectors 
but do a worse job in others, meaning that some of these models have to be adjusted for new 
industry features. 
                                                 
1 We refer to the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt-equity swap and the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) model 
interchangeably.    2 
  Another important issue that deserves our attention is the study of systematic prediction 
errors. Are there any bond-specific, firm-specific or market variables that have a systematic 
relationship with spread errors? Among other factors, we intend to study the influence of size, 
leverage, maturity, rating, asset volatility and firm-growth opportunities in the performance of 
the models. This is important not only because the existing empirical literature contains some 
contradictory  results  in  this  analysis  but  also  because  we  introduce  some  new  explanatory 
variables, namely the yield to maturity and the market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for growth 
opportunities).  
  To  our  best  knowledge,  this  paper  is  the  first  study  that  calibrates  and  evaluates  the 
performance of the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt–equity swap. There are some calibrations 
of strategic debt services models such as the one by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) treated 
in Huang and Huang (2002). However, they do not explicitly calibrate the Fan and Sundaresan 
(2000) debt–equity swap. The calibration of this model allows us to discuss the importance of a 
negotiation  process  between  stockholders  and  debtholders  in  the  distribution  of  the  firm’s 
claims at liquidation. 
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2  there  is  a  discussion  of  the  existing 
literature  in  the  field  and,  in  Section  3,  a  presentation  of  the  theoretical  assumptions  and 
valuation formulae of each model. Section 4 presents the empirical implementation, where we 
explain the process of data gathering and the calibration procedure adopted to implement the 
models. Section 5 gives the empirical results and a discussion of the performance of the models 
and the systematic prediction errors. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize the main findings of 
the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Recent years have seen many theoretical developments in the field of credit risk research. Most 
of this research has concentrated on the pricing of corporate and sovereign defaultable bonds as   3 
the basis of credit risk pricing. These studies can be divided in two main categories: structural 
models and reduced-form models. 
  Structural models have their origins in the framework of Merton (1974), which has been 
the key foundation of corporate debt pricing. Relying on the contingent claims analysis of Black 
and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) presents a simplified model that can be used to value each 
component  of  the  firm’s  liability  mix.  In  a  structural  framework,  the  default  process  of  a 
company is driven by the value of the company’s assets and the firm’s default risk is explicitly 
linked to the variability in the firm’s asset value. Under these structural models, all the relevant 
credit risk elements, including default, are a function of the structural characteristics of the firm: 
asset volatility (business risk) and leverage (financial risk). Reduced-form models, on the other 
hand, do not condition default on the value of the firm, and parameters related to the firm’s 
value do not need to be estimated.  
  Despite the innovative nature of the Merton (1974) model, allowing for the valuation of a 
firm’s debt and equity without a prior knowledge of the real drift of the firm’s asset, it presents 
many  shortcomings  that  are  essentially  due  to  its  simplifying  assumptions  about  reality.  It 
assumes that the liability structure of the firm consists only of a single class of debt, a non-
callable zero coupon bond, and that bankruptcy is not only costless but also cannot be triggered 
before maturity. In addition, it assumes that the absolute priority rule always holds at maturity, 
meaning that equityholders can only obtain a positive payoff after debtholders have been totally 
reimbursed. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption. Franks and Torous (1994) show that the 
strict absolute priority rule was violated in 78% of the bankruptcies of their sample. Another 
important stylized version of reality is the assumption of a flat term structure of interest rates.  
  Many papers, including Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994), Leland and 
Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral 
and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000) and Collin-Dufresne and Golstein (2001), 
have extended the original Merton (1974) model to incorporate more realistic assumptions. A 
new assumption, which is common to all these models, and represents a major improvement of   4 
the Merton framework, is the possibility of early default. In these models the firm can go into 
bankruptcy before maturity, as soon as a bankruptcy trigger for the asset value is reached.  
Leland (1994) extends the Black and Cox (1976) endogenous default model to include the 
tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy costs. The first “real world friction” works an incentive to 
increase the leverage (because of the tax benefit of interest payment) and bankruptcy costs as a 
disincentive. However, the Leland (1994) model still has the limitation of assuming full respect 
for the absolute priority rule. In fact, the recognition that bankruptcy procedures leave some 
considerable scope for strategic behaviours from the different claimants involved leads to the 
appearance of new structural models, usually denominated strategic debt service models. These 
include the Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and 
Sundaresan (2000) models. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) enhance Anderson and Sundaresan’s 
(1996) model by considering first, a continuous time-framework, and secondly, corporate taxes. 
It addition, they introduce a bargaining power parameter, making possible a redistribution of 
power between debtholders and equityholders. 
Several empirical studies have pointed out the weaknesses of the Merton (1974) model, in 
particular its incapacity to generate the levels of yields spreads observed in the market. These 
include, among others, the papers of Jones et al. (1984), Ogden (1987), Wei and Guo (1997), 
Lyden and Saraniti (2000), Ericsson and Reneby (2002) and Eom et al. (2004). 
Jones et al. (1984) analysed 177 bonds issued by 15 firms and found that the Merton model 
overestimates bond prices by an average of 4.5%. They conclude that the model performs better 
for speculative grade bonds and that prediction errors are systematically related to maturity, 
equity variance and leverage. Ogden (1987), on the other hand, looked at 57 callable bonds and 
sinkable corporate bonds and found that the Merton model under-estimates spreads by 104 basis 
points (bp) on average. These studies suffer from some problems with the inclusion of callable 
bonds and sinking fund provisions. By considering bonds with these features it is difficult to 
evaluate whether the under-estimation revealed by the Merton model is due to its assumptions 
or to the pricing of these features by investors.   5 
In the last decade, the studies of Lyden and Saraniti (2000), Ericsson and Reneby (2002) 
and Eom et al. (2004) represent an improvement in terms of the quality of the bond sample. All 
these studies not only use firms with simple capital structures but also exclude from the sample 
bonds with any call or sinking fund provision. Lyden and Saraniti (2000), who compare the 
performance of the Merton (1974) model with the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model, find 
that both these models under-estimate the credit spread. For the Merton model the average 
under-estimation in credit spread is between 80 and 90 bp and the errors are systematically 
related  to  coupon  and  time  to  maturity.  Ericsson  and  Reneby  (2002),  who  implemented  a 
perpetual  bond  model  based  on  the  Black  and  Cox  (1976)  framework,  found  a  good 
performance of the model. They also found that prediction errors are linked to liquidity. There is 
a greater under-estimation of credit spread for speculative grade bonds, which are perceived to 
be less liquid.  
  To date, the most comprehensive empirical study about the performance of corporate debt 
pricing models is found in Eom et al. (2004). They assess the empirical performance of the 
Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996) and 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) models using a sample of 182 bond prices during the 
period 1986–97. For the Merton (1974) model the under-estimation problem is confirmed but 
for other models, like Leland and Toft (1996), there is an overestimation of credit spread, which 
they report as due to the accuracy of the calibration process. The prediction power of these 
models seems to be related to leverage, size, asset volatility and some term structure control 
variables. 
 
3. Theoretical Models 
In this section we summarize the main theoretical assumptions of the Merton (1974) and Leland 
(1994) models and the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt–equity swap. Moreover, there is  a 
presentation of the formulae concerning the firm value, equity, debt and credit spread that are 
the support of the calibration procedure discussed in Section 4.   6 
3.1 Merton (1974)  
Merton (1974), being the seminal paper on structural models, relies on a set of assumptions that 
constitute the basis for many other models. Among others, it assumes that the dynamics for the 
value of the assets, Vt, can be described by a diffusion-type process with stochastic differential 
equation 
              ( ) t t t t dZ V dt V dV s d m + - =                       (3.1) 
where m is the instantaneous expected rate of return on the assets, d is the constant fraction of 
value paid to both equityholders and debtholders (payout ratio), s the constant variance of the 
return on the underlying asset, and Zt a standard Wiener process. Even though the original 
version of the Merton (1974) model assumes no payout ratio, we incorporate this parameter in 
our model, as most firms pay both interest to bondholders and dividends to equityholders.  
   The  asset  value  is  financed  both  by  equity,  E,  and  one  representative  zero-coupon 
noncallable debt contract, D, with maturity T and face value F. The value of the firm and the 
asset value are identical and do not depend on the capital structure itself. The asset value, V0, is 
thus given by the sum of risky debt and equity. With this framework, equity can be seen as a 
call option on the value of the firm with strike price F. On the other hand, debtholders have 
bought a risk-free bond with face value F and given the equityholders the option to sell them the 
firm’s assets for F. Equity and debt values are therefore given by Black and Scholes (1973) 
formulae: 
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where  ( )  N  is the cumulative standard normal distribution.    7 
  One of the most important variables that is analysed in this study is the credit spread, CS. It 
is defined as the difference between the yield to maturity, ytm, and the risk free rate r. The ytm 
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where it can be seen that the credit spread is a direct function of the quasi-debt ratio 0 /V Fe
rT - , 
maturity  and  asset  volatility.  Intimately  related  to  credit  spread  is  the  risk  neutral  default 
probability (RNDP), which is, in this case, represented by N(–d2). 
 
3.2 Leland (1994)  
In the Leland (1994) model the firm value still follows (3.1) and the risk-free rate is constant
2. 
Leland (1994) models a tax environment in which perpetual continuous coupon payments, C, 
are tax deductible. Considering a constant corporate tax ratet , the firm obtains tax shields from 
its debt at a rate Ct  until default. Bankruptcy occurs when the firm value reaches a threshold 
Vb. In this case, the firm incurs costs aVb, where a is defined as the bankruptcy cost parameter 
or one minus the recovery rate. Because of these new “real world features” the levered firm 
value, v, is no longer identical to the unlevered firm value Vu. Rather, the firm value increases in 
the amount of tax shield, TS, and decreases in the amount of bankruptcy cost, BC. Under these 
new assumptions, the debt value is now 
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2 Once again we consider the version of Leland (1994) with payout ratio.   8 
  Pb can be interpreted as the RNDP and l as the elasticity of the probability of default with 
respect to the value of the assets of the firm. As such, it is negative and increases with the 
volatility of the assets of the firm.  
  The bankruptcy costs and the tax shields are given by equations (3.7) and (3.8), and the 
total firm value and equity value by equations (3.9) and (3.10), respectively: 
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The credit spread is  
              r
D
C
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3.3 The Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt–equity swap 
The Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt–equity swap assumes that at an endogenously determined 
lower  reorganization  boundary  debtholders  are  offered  a  proportion  of  the  firm’s  equity  to 
replace the original debt contract. This can be thought of as a distress exchange. At certain 
trigger point Vb the claimants negotiate not to operate the firm and sell their stake to outsiders 
who pay them the value of the assets of the firm. It resembles a swap because debtholders swap 
their debt for equity and then sell the equity to potential buyers.  
  Unlike Leland (1994), which does not include the possibility of debt renegotiation, Fan and 
Sundaresan  (2000)  assume  a  continuous  bargaining  power  parameter  h.  When  h  =  1, 
equityholders have all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it offers to debtholders. 
On the other hand, when h = 0, we get the Leland (1994) outcome where debtholders make 
take-it-or-leave-it offers to equityholders.  With this refinement in Leland’s (1994) model the 
valuation framework is changed as follows. The debt value is now defined as   9 
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where the new bankruptcy threshold is 
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and Pb and l are defined as before. Equity and firm value are given by equations (3.14) and 
(3.15), respectively: 
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As Fan and Sundaresan (2000) also assumes a continuous perpetual coupon, the credit spread is 
given by equation (3.11). 
 
4. Empirical Implementation 
This section is organized in two parts. First we describe the process of data gathering and 
secondly we present the calibration procedure used to estimate the parameters of the models. 
We provide a specific description of the estimation of each model’s parameters.  
 
4.1 Data 
In order to test empirically the models presented earlier it is important to select a sample of 
companies with simple capital structures. Ideally, we should have companies with zero coupon 
bonds when testing the Merton (1974) model and companies with perpetual bonds when testing 
the Leland (1994) and the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) models. However, since it is not always 
possible to find these “perfect” bonds in the markets, the most reasonable approach consists in 
selecting bonds that have reliable prices and straightforward cashflows. An attempt to use these 
models to price corporate debt of firms with complex capital structures would raise doubts as to 
whether pricing errors are due to the assumptions of the models or to their inability to price this 
sort of debt.    10 
The first selection criterion used in this study consists in (1) limiting the sample to U.S. 
non-financial firms with no more than three bonds (issued in U.S. dollars). In addition, the 
following  criteria  are  applied:  (2)  consider  only  coupon  bonds  with  all  principal  retired  at 
maturity (bullet bonds); (3) do not include bonds with option features like callable, convertible 
or putable bonds; (4) do not include floating-rate bonds or bonds with sinking fund provisions; 
and (5) do not include bonds with time to maturity less than one year, as they are unlikely to 
trade
3. 
Bond  data  were  obtained  from  DATASTREAM  but,  in  order  to  assure  the  straight 
application of these criteria, there was a double check of the characteristic of the bonds by 
consulting their prospectus on the EDGAR database
4. Furthermore, in order to assure some 
reliability of the bond prices, all the bonds with the same quote for more than two months 
(despite the changes in interest rates) were excluded. As a final criterion there is the requirement 
that  all  these  companies  have  publicly  traded  stock.  Stock  prices  are  not  only  required  to 
compute the market value of equity but also to compute the stock volatility. In the end the 
sample consisted in 50 bonds. The firms are grouped in a total of six sectors, namely Industrial, 
Consumer  Cyclical,  Energy,  Basic  Materials,  Healthcare  and  Consumer  Non-Cyclical.  This 
grouping is based on Thomson ONE Banker sector convention
5. 
The time-period of the study was set as 2001–04. Since DATASTREAM does not provide 
bond price information prior to 28/09/2001 it was not possible to extend this period. Another 
important  issue  of  the  data  selection  process  is  the  frequency  of  the  data.  As  some  of  the 
variables of the study rely on accounting data we have to make bond information “compatible” 
with accounting information.  This being so, and trying to maximize the number of observations 
in  the  time  series,  it  was  decided  to  use  quarterly  observations  (in  the  end  the  pricing 
performance was carried out using 317 observations). 
                                                 
3  These  are  necessary  but  not  sufficient  conditions. We  do not  include  in  our  sample  all  the  bonds 
satisfying these conditions. 
4  EDGAR  database  is  available  at  SEC  (U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission)  web  site 
www.sec.gov. 
5 Source: http://banker.analytics.thomsonib.com/ta/   11 
  Appendix A.1 presents summary statistics on the 50 bonds in the sample. There are a total 
of 10 companies with just one traded bond, 17 companies with two traded bonds and only 2 
companies with three traded bonds. The average coupon rate for all bonds is 6.916%, ranging 
from 4.875 to 8.875%. The Consumer Non-Cyclical sector has the bonds with highest coupons 
and, not surprisingly, is also the one with the highest average yield spread, namely 279.9 bp. 
The average yield spread is 221.5 bp for all bonds and most of the bonds (88% of the sample) 
are investment grade bonds (rated BBB– or higher).  
  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  implementation  of  the  model  requires  some  accounting 
information,  namely  information  about  the  liability  structure  of  the  firm.  Quarterly  balance 
sheets  for  each  company  were  obtained  from  EDGAR  database.  Appendix  A.2  lists  some 
descriptive statistics about the firms. These firms are reasonably large, as the average market 
value of assets is around $6 billion. For most companies, the market leverage (average 37.4%) 
is  substantially  below  the  book  leverage  (average  56.1%).  A  more  detailed  analysis  of  the 
liability structure reveals that, on average, the market value of traded bonds does not represent 
more than 25.6% of total liabilities. These figures are very similar to previous empirical studies 
on structural models: for example, see Lyden and Saraniti (2000). The sector with the highest 
proportion of traded bonds in total liabilities is the Consumer Non-Cyclical with 30.8%. Bond 
time to maturity ranges from 3.4 to 26.4 years but the average is around 9.7 years. Another 
interesting statistic is the high stock volatility of these firms (36.2% on average). This feature is 
somewhat related to the high volatility period and downward trend in the U.S. economy that 
followed  the  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11th.  Revealing  its  dependence  on  the  market 
evolution, the Consumer Cyclical sector presents the highest volatility of the sample (43.5%).  
 
4.2 Parameters 
This  section  provides  all  the  information  about  the  model’s  calibration.  The  term  structure 
estimation  is  discussed  in  the  first  instance  in  a  separate  section  since  this  information  is 
common to all models. Then, there is a detailed description of the estimation of the parameters 
specific to each model.   12 
4.2.1 Term Structure of Risk-Free Rate 
In order to calibrate the structural model of corporate debt pricing it is necessary to estimate a 
term structure for the risk-free rate. Several methods can be used to model the risk-free yield 
curve: for example, the Nelson–Siegel (1987) and the Vasicek (1977) models. In Eom et al. 
(2004) these two models were applied and the term structure estimated was very similar. In this 
paper  the  risk-free  yield  curve  is  estimated  by  fitting  the  Nelson–Siegel  (1987)  curve  (see 
Appendix A.3 for details about the estimation).  
 
4.2.2 The Merton (1974) Model 
The Merton model specification developed in section 3 requires the use of six parameters: asset 
value, asset volatility, face value of debt, maturity of the debt, risk-free rate and payout ratio. 
This section demonstrates the estimation process for these parameters.  
  Merton’s model theoretical framework is adequate to price properly a very specific sort of 
corporate debt: zero coupon debt. However, all the companies in the sample not only have 
several kinds of debt but also the only kind of traded debt that they have is coupon debt, with all 
principal retired at maturity. Therefore, some criteria have to be adopted in order to convert 
“real debt” into a “synthetic Merton debt”. We started by focusing only on traded debt, which 
means only on the bonds issued by the firms. Having market prices for these bonds makes the 
analysis of pricing errors much more reliable since we can directly compare these market prices 
with the predicted prices given by the model.  
  We consider the duration of the bonds as a proxy for the maturity of Merton zero-coupon 
debt. This seems reasonable because the duration of each bond is a weighted average of the 
maturity of each coupon and the final principal, with the weights being based on the present 
value of each payment, discounted at the yield to maturity of the bond
6. For companies with a 
single bond, this was assumed as the maturity for Merton’s formula and for companies with 
                                                 
6  Other  approaches  have  been  used  by  other  studies.  A  recent  approach,  developed  by  Cooper  and 
Davydenko (2003) consists in solving Merton’s valuation equation for maturity, obtaining an implied 
debt maturity. On the other hand, Eom et al. (2004) assume each coupon payment as a separate zero and 
then use Merton’s model to value each zero separately.   13 
more than one bond Merton’s model maturity was computed as a weighted average duration of 
all bonds. With this approach we are implicitly assuming that the liability structure will remain 
constant over time and that no default can happen before this portfolio duration.  
  Having obtained the Nelson–Siegel (1987) risk-free yield curve function, the computation 
of the risk free rate for the portfolio of bonds is straightforward. It is just the risk-free rate 
corresponding to the duration of the portfolio (maturity of the zero in Merton’s model). The face 
value of the portfolio of bonds to be considered in Merton’s estimation is computed as follows: 
we discount to period zero all the coupons and principal of each bond at the corresponding risk-
free rate, and then compound the sum of their present value to the maturity of the zero computed 
previously. This final value can be considered as a synthetic face value, which replicates the 
original payments of the bonds.  
  As regards the payout ratio, a natural proxy for it would be a weighted average of the 
coupon  rate  and  the  dividend  yield,  with  the  weights  based  on  the  market  value  of  total 
liabilities (market value of traded debt plus book value of all other liabilities) and the market 
value of equity. However, since the synthetic face value computed previously for the Merton 
model  already  incorporates  the  coupons  of  the  bonds,  these  were  ignored  in  this  weighted 
average. 
  At this stage the challenge is to estimate the last two missing parameters: asset value and 
asset volatility. We solve simultaneously two equations in order to obtain asset value and asset 
volatility
7. The first equation is Merton’s equity valuation equation defined in Section 3 as 
equation (3.2). As we are focusing the implementation of the models only on traded bonds, we 
cannot assume the total value of equity when using this formula. This value should be based on 
the  proportion  of  the  analysed  traded  bonds  on  market  value  of  total  liabilities.  With  this 
approach, we keep the focus on traded debt and also maintain the original leverage of the firm 
and consequently the original probability of bankruptcy. The second equation follows from Ito’s 
                                                 
7 Another recent method is the one proposed by Vassalou and Xing (2004), which uses an iterative 
process to obtain a time series of asset values that allows further computation of asset volatility. Cooper 
and Davydenko’s (2003) method is also quite reasonable. In this case an iterative process is used to obtain 
simultaneously  the  implied  maturity  and  asset  volatility  but  the  asset  value  is  not  an  output  of  this 
process.   14 
lemma and the assumptions of the contingent claims analysis. It assumes that the relationship 
between stock volatility ( E s ) and asset volatility ( A s ) should be 









=                            (4.1) 
where ¶E/¶V0  is the partial derivative of the value of equity with respect to the value of the 
firm. In Merton’s model this last figure is equivalent to N(d1). Using numerical solutions we can 
easily obtain a time series of asset value and asset volatility for each quarter. 
 
4.2.3 The Leland (1994) Model  
The calibration procedure adopted in Leland’s model is very similar to the one used in Merton’s 
model.  Having  a  proxy  for  the  risk-free  rate,  coupon,  corporate  tax  rate,  bankruptcy  cost 
parameter and payout ratio, the remaining task is to numerically obtain the unlevered asset value 
and asset volatility. 
  In Leland’s model, we should discount each continuous coupon using a continuous rate.  
However, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the flat interest rate in this model is an 
implied rate that makes the present value of a 30 year annuity (discounting each coupon at the 
corresponding risk-free rate of the Nelson–Siegel curve) equal to the present value of the same 
annuity discounted at the unknown risk-free rate Leland r
8. This method seems reasonable since 
the corresponding risk-free rate captures not only the short-term level of the risk-free rate but 
also the long-term level.  
  When calibrating Merton’s  model  we  had the problem of transforming “real” periodic 
coupon payments and a final principal payment at maturity into a single payment, denominated 
face value of debt. Now we have the problem of transforming these original payments into a 
perpetual  coupon  payment.  The  solution  to  this  problem  follows  the  same  method  used 
previously. The idea is to make the original debt comparable to Merton’s debt and to Leland’s 
debt by making equal the present value of this debt, using the risk free rate as discount rate. As 
                                                 
8 The coupon used in this numerical estimation ($6.914M) was computed using the average coupon rate 
of all bonds in the sample (6.914%) and the most commonly used nominal value of bonds ($100M).   15 
we already have the present value of Merton’s riskless debt and the risk-free rate at which we 
will discount the perpetual coupon, Leland’s perpetual coupon is determined by solving the 
equation  






-                       (4.2) 
  The corporate tax rate and the bankruptcy cost parameter are new in relation to Merton’s 
model. Following Leland (1994) paper we assume a corporate tax rate of 35%. The bankruptcy 
cost parameter is defined as one minus the recovery rate and is obtained in an industry basis 
using the Altman and Kishore (1996) study about recovery rates.  
  Having  all  the  above  variables  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  numerically  estimate  the 
unlevered firm value and asset volatility. Again, we have two equations and two unknowns. The 
first equation is the equity valuation equation (3.10) and the second equation is now 










=                        (4.3) 
where ¶E/¶Vu is now the partial derivative of the value of equity with respect to the unlevered 
firm value. There are two differences between this equation and equation (4.1) used in Merton’s 
calibration.  First,  instead  of  asset  value  V0  we  should  consider  unlevered  firm  value  Vu. 
Secondly, the partial derivative ¶E/¶Vu is not N(d1) as before but is given by 
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4.2.4 The Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt–equity swap 
As the Fan and Sundaresan debt–equity swap only introduces the bargaining power parameter in 
Leland’s model, its calibration is very similar to Leland’s. The difference relies in the partial 
derivative  ¶E/¶Vu  necessary  to  compute  simultaneously  the  unlevered  firm  value  and  asset 
volatility since the equity value formula has now a different specification. Thus, equation (4.4) 
of Leland’s model is replaced by 
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5. Empirical Results 
This section is organized in four topics. First, we analyse the distribution of credit spreads and 
RNDP  for  the  total  sample  and  on  a  sector  basis.  Then,  in  Section  5.2,  we  evaluate  the 
performance of the Merton and Leland models by interpreting average values of prediction 
errors in price, yield and spread. In Section 5.3 there is a discussion of the systematic factors 
that may explain the spread errors of Merton model and finally, in Section 5.4, the Fan and 
Sundaresan debt/equity swap is discussed. We analyse the results of the Fan and Sundaresan 
debt–equity swap in a separate section (making a direct comparison with Leland) because we 
want to highlight the particular feature that distinguishes this swap from Leland model: the 
negotiation power parameter.   
 
5.1 Distribution of Credit Spreads and RNDP 
In the data section we reported information about the credit spread for each bond in the sample 
and averages values for each sector (presented in Appendix A.1). Now, we are in position to go 
further in the analysis, by comparing the observed credit spread with the credit spread predicted 
by Merton and Leland models and an approximation of credit spread based in a Merrill Lynch 
study, as illustrated in Table 1
9.  
  The first important conclusion suggested by the results of Table 1 is that both the Merton 
and Leland models under-estimate the credit spread. This is true not only for the average values 
of the total sample but also for the industry averages. The average market spread of the total 
sample is more than three times higher than the spread predicted by the Merton and Leland 
models (221.5 bp against 58.9 bp and 57.1 bp, respectively). Furthermore, Table 1 shows that 
the bonds in the sample also have an average market spread higher than the average spread 
presented by U.S. firms in the Merrill Lynch study (169.3 bp in this last case). 
                                                 
9  Prior  to  the  analysis  of  these  results,  we  should  mention  that,  for  estimation  purposes,  a  rating 
conversion  table  was  constructed. We  assign  the  number  one  to  the  highest  rating  (AAA+)  and  the 
number 23 to the lowest rating (D).
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  Focusing  the  analysis  on  observed  credit  spread,  we  verify  that  the  Consumer  Non-
Cyclical sector has the highest spread (279.9 bp), followed by the Consumer Cyclical (250.3 bp) 
and the Basic Materials (247.0 bp). The result of the Consumer Cyclical sector is consistent 
with the highest coupon rates of its bonds (already reported in Appendix A.1) and also with its 
worst rating quality. The average rating in this sector is 11, which corresponds to BBB-, the cut-
off category of investment grade bonds. In the group of bonds with the lowest market spread we 
have the Energy (209.7 bp), Industrial (191.2 bp) and the Healthcare (171.7 bp) sectors. These 
are  also  the  sectors  with  the  best  rating,  which  reveals  an  important  negative  association 
between rating and market spread. 
  In order to improve the analysis of market spread, it is important to have an idea of its 
distribution. Appendix A.4 displays this distribution for the total sample. This distribution is far 
from normal. There is a higher concentration of observations between 100 bp and 125 bp and 
then many more observations to the right of this range than to the left. Between 150 bp and 350 
bp the frequency is quite constant and there are some important observations above 700 bp
10.  
  In addition to the credit spread estimation reported in Table 1 it is important to analyse the 
risk-neutral default probability predicted by the models, since these two variables are directly 
related. Table 2 summarizes the results of this last variable. It also reports Moody’s one-year 
default  rates  for  bonds  during  1999  based  on  cross  sectional  information  about  rating  and 
maturity. Although this information is not directly comparable with the RNDP it provides an 
idea of which sectors are likely to present a higher default rate. 
  As expected, the sectors with the highest predicted RNDP are also the sectors with the 
highest predicted spread. The Consumer Cyclical assumes the leading of this ranking with a 
RNDP of 22.9% predicted by the Merton model (predicted spread of 149.3 bp, Table 1) and 
17.4% predicted by the Leland model (predicted spread of 108.3 bp). The sector with the lowest 
                                                 
10 An industry analysis of the distribution of market spread (not reported) reveals some similarities among 
industries. In none of the sectors does the distribution seem to be normal and most sectors reveal a strong 
dispersion of credit spreads, with the exception of Energy. In most sectors ranges of high frequency are 
followed by low frequency and again by high frequency.
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predicted RNDP (and lowest credit spread) is the Consumer Non-Cyclical, with 7.1% and 3.6% 
in the Merton and the Leland’s model, respectively. 
  There seems to be some contradiction between this ranking and the ranking based on the 
observed market spread. The  structural  models  predict  the  lowest  RNDP  and  the lowest  
credit  spread  for  the  sector  with  the  highest  market  spread: Consumer  Non-Cyclical. This 
underpricing issue will be analysed in more detail in the next section but there seems to be a 
reason for that particular case. The three companies of the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector reveal 
an historical 250 days stock volatility that is quite low, which resulted in low asset volatility 
estimation  and  consequently  a  high  under-estimation  of  credit  spread  and  RNDP  by  the 
structural models. 
  Finally,  taking  into  account  cross  sectional  information  about  maturity  and  rating,  we 
verify  that  the  overall  one-year  default  rate  is  no  more  than  0.11%.  Given  its  rating 
characteristics, the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector is the one which potentially presents a high 
default rate, between 0.11% and 1.12%. The sector with the lowest default rate (between 0.00% 
and 0.11%) is the Industrial sector. This ranking in is accordance with the ranking based on the 
market spread and the Merrill Lynch spread of Table 1.   
  As a summary of this section we can say that the first results of the structural models 
reveal an under-estimation of credit spreads and that both the observed credit spread and the 
predicted spreads are characterized by a high dispersion. The RNDP ranges from 10.5% in the 
Leland model to 12.3% in the Merton model. Even though the Consumer Non-Cyclical and the 
Consumer Cyclical sectors have the highest market spreads, the predictions of the models are 
not always coincident with these results. 
 
5.2 Prediction Errors 
In this section we discuss the performance of the models. How well can the models fit the 
market prices, yields and credit spreads? We decompose the analysis into two parts. First, there 
is a general overview of model performance by considering all the sample observations (Section 
5.2.1) and then we focus the analysis on several categories, according to rating, maturity of the   19 
bonds, asset volatility of the firms and sectors (Section 5.2.2). We test whether the prediction 
errors are significantly different from zero, if there are differences between Merton and Leland’s 
estimation and whether there are differences in the estimation for the categories  mentioned 
above. 
 
5.2.1 Predicted Errors - Total Sample  
Table 3 summarizes the prediction errors for the Merton and Leland models for the total sample. 
We consider the relative errors to be more informative of model performance since it allows for 
comparisons between the two models and later on, among categories. Parallel to these predicted 
errors we also test whether the mean relative errors are different from zero and whether there are 
differences between the Merton and Leland means. Appendices A.5 and A.6 report the p-values 
for these tests not only for the total sample, which is analysed in this section, but also for the 
grouping  of  relative  errors  according  to  sector,  rating,  maturity  and  asset  volatility,  that  is 
discussed in the next section. 
  The first conclusion that can be drawn from Table 3 is that both models over-estimate 
bonds prices. Merton’s model mean over-estimation is about 11.2% and that of Leland’s model 
is 4.5% (both means are significantly different from zero, as reported in Appendix A.5). The 
results found for the Merton model show an overestimation higher than the 4.5% found by 
Jones  et  al.  (1984)  and  the  1.69%  by  Eom  et  al.  (2004).  Not  surprisingly,  we  found  that 
Leland’s model overprices bonds less than Merton’s model (the equality of means does not hold 
for a 5% significance level). This is essentially due to the consideration of early default and cost 
of financial distress in Leland’s model.  
  Another important issue that should be discussed when analysing both models’ relative 
pricing  errors  is  the  distribution  of  these  errors.  These  are  depicted  in  Figure  1.  There  is 
evidence that the Merton distribution of relative pricing errors is skewed to the right while 
Leland’s  distribution  is  just  moderately  skewed  to  the  left.  This  reveals  a  tendency  of  the 
Merton model to overestimate bonds more than Leland’s model. Figure 1 also shows that there 
is  a  high  dispersion  of  pricing  errors,  which  is  more  pronounced  in  Leland’s  distribution   20 
(standard deviation of 12.3% in Leland against 8.9% in Merton). This pattern of high dispersion 
is similar to the one found in previous literature.  
  Regarding the yield and credit spread, we notice, as expected, that both structural models 
under-estimate these figures. The relative yield error is –30.5% and –3.4% for the Merton and 
Leland models, respectively, and the relative credit spread error is –76.2% and –75.0%, also  
respectively (all means are statistically different from zero). Again, we can compare the results 
for the Merton model with the Eom et al. (2004) study.  The results found for the yield relative 
error show less under-estimation than did Eom et al. (2004). They found a relative yield error of 
–91.3%  while  our’s  is  only  –30.5%.  However,  considering  the  relative  spread  error,  the 
conclusion is somewhat different. Our mean of –76.2% shows more under-estimation of credit 
spread than they found: –54.4%. 
  The  incapacity  to  generate  sufficiently  high  spreads  is  one  of  the  main  criticisms  of 
structural models. There are several possible explanations for that. Some rely on technical issues 
and others on theoretical issues. Regarding the technical issues, there seems to be a tractability 
problem.  Recall  that  both  the  Merton  and  Leland  models  are  approximating  actual  straight 
coupon bonds with finite maturity with some “synthetic type of debt”. In Merton’s case it is a 
zero  coupon  debt  and  in  the  Leland  model  it  is  perpetual  debt,  with  a  continuous  coupon 
payment. The calibration procedure used to convert “real debt” into “synthetic debt” will imply 
a different relationship between yields and prices in the model and in reality.  
  From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  these  structural  models,  which  are  based  on  the 
contingent  claim  theory,  tend  to  generate  low  credit  spreads  because  they  only  capture  the 
default risk component. Besides the credit risk component, actual credit spreads are very likely 
to include compensation for liquidity (marketability), taxes or systematic risk. There is another 
feature related to “real” bonds that these two models do not capture: jumps in asset value. These 
models assume, as we explained in Section 3, a geometric Brownian motion process for the 
asset value and, therefore, do not admit sudden changes (jumps) in the asset value. Even though 
these jumps are not so common in practice, there may be a small proportion of the market 
spread that compensates for jump risk not priced by the models.   21 
  When comparing Merton’s relative spread error with Leland’s relative spread error, we 
would expect a less negative error for the Leland model, as it incorporates more “real world” 
features, namely the possibility of early default. However, this is not the case in our study. The 
p-value found for the equality of means is 0.6779, which reveals that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of means (for a 5% significance level).  
  Although we do not report here the graphs with the distributions of relative yield and 
spread errors, we shall say that there is a clear distinction between the distribution of yield 
errors and the distribution of spread errors. While the distribution of yield errors has some 
similarities  with  a  normal  distribution,  the  distribution  of  spread  errors  shows  an  extreme 
concentration of observations in the lower bound. This pattern is more pronounced in Merton’s 
distribution. In this case there are 166 observations (52% of total) in the range between –99% 
and –92%. But, at the same time, there are also some important observations with very positive 
spread errors: in the range above 44% there are 10 observations. This reveals the high dispersion 
of spread errors, usually a characteristic of these empirical studies.  
 
5.2.2 Predicted Errors by Category 
In the previous section we discussed the performance of the structural models considering all 
the observations in the sample. However, there might be differences in the estimation errors 
depending on the rating category of the bonds, its maturity or even the asset volatility of the 
firms. In this section we analyse the performance of the models according to this grouping and 
also according to sector. 
  To detect any rating effect, we divided the sample in two rating categories: high rating 
(bonds with a numerical rating conversion below 11 or BBB–) and low rating (all others). This 
does not correspond to the standard distinction between investment grade bonds and speculative 
grade bonds because there are only 32 observations of speculative grade bonds in the sample. It 
would not be reasonable to compare results from a sub-sample of 32 observations with those 
from a sub-sample of 285 observations of investment grade bonds. The split resulted in 196 
observations of high rated bonds and 121 of low rated bonds. As regards the remaining time to   22 
maturity  of  the  bonds,  we  analyse  three  sub-samples:  short  maturity  (less  than  five  years), 
medium maturity (from five to 10 years) and long maturity (above 10 years), corresponding to 
49,  169  and  99  observations,  respectively.  In  order  to  discuss  any  volatility  effects  we 
decompose the sample in low asset volatility (below 20%) and high asset  volatility (above 
20%), which results in two sub-samples of 152 and 165 observations, respectively. 
  Appendix A.7 reports the p-values of a two-way ANOVA test that evaluates, as a null 
hypothesis, no category effects according to rating, maturity of the bonds, asset volatility and 
sectors. Considering a 5% significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of no effects in 
Merton’s and Leland’s relative errors (pricing, yield and spread) according to rating, maturity, 
asset volatility and sector, except for the maturity in Leland’s relative spread error (p-value of 
0.1258).  To  complement  this  analysis  it  is  important  to  analyse  the  values  of  the  relative 
predicted errors.  
  Appendix A.8 displays the mean relative errors according to the rating category of the 
bonds, the maturity, asset volatility of the firms and sector. Both Merton’s and Leland’s models 
under-estimate less the spread for high rating categories. Merton’s mean spread error is –72.9% 
for high rating bonds and –81.5% for low rating bonds. Our findings are in accordance with 
what we should expect from the performance of the models. We should expect a lower capacity 
of the models to predict spreads of low rating bonds because low rating bonds are usually less 
liquid. Thus, their spread must show a bigger compensation for liquidity risk, which is not 
captured  by  structural  models.  These  models  only  capture  default  risk.  A  comparison  to 
previous  studies  shows  that  our  results  confirm  the  results  found  by  Ericsson  and  Reneby 
(2002). These authors report a better performance of their structural model for speculative grade 
bonds.  
  In  the  Merton  model  the  tendency  toward  under-estimation  of  spread  appears  to  be 
somewhat stronger among short maturity bonds. Merton’s relative mean spread error is –97% 
for short maturity bonds, –77.4% for medium maturities and –63.9% for long maturities. In this 
case  our  results  are  in  accordance  with  previous  studies  in  the  field,  namely  Ericsson  and 
Reneby (2002) and Eom et al. (2004).    23 
  Another interesting result from our study is that these structural models fit better the prices 
and spreads of more risky firms. Merton’s relative price error is 13.6% for low volatile firms 
and  only  8.9%  for  high  volatile  firms.  Concerning  the  spread,  there  is  an  extreme  under-
estimation  for  low  volatile  firms, namely –93.4%, while  for  more  risky  firms  this  is only 
–60.3%. Leland’s results show some similarity, especially for the credit spread error. There is 
also  empirical  evidence  that  for  high  volatile  firms  the  Leland  model  can  fit  with  extreme 
precision the prices of the bonds. Leland’s relative pricing error for this category is significantly 
equal to zero. 
   We have already mentioned that there exists a sector effect in the performance of the 
models. Now we will analyse which characteristics of the bonds or of the firms belonging to 
these sectors might lead to a better or worst performance of the structural models. Once again, 
we should rely on the results of Appendix A.8. 
  There are two sectors where the Merton model seems to perform better when predicting 
the credit spread: the Consumer Cyclical and the Energy sector. The relative spread errors have 
a mean of –58% and –62.5% in these two sectors, respectively, when the mean for the total 
sample is –76.2%. By reconciling this information with the descriptive statistics on the bonds 
and the firms reported earlier, we verify that these sectors present some characteristics usually 
associated with a better prediction power of the Merton model. The bonds in the Consumer 
Cyclical sector have an average maturity above the average of the total sample and its firms also 
present asset volatilities and leverage levels above the total sample. We have already established 
that the Merton model performs better for long maturity bonds and more risky firms. Regarding 
the leverage, the empirical literature shows that Merton’s model usually under-estimates less the 
spreads  for  high  leverage  firms.  In  relation  to  the  Energy  sector  we  believe  that  the  good 
performance of the Merton model is probably due to the highest average time to maturity of its 
bonds (14.2 years for an overall average of 9.7 years). 
  In the group of sectors with worst predictive power of the Merton model we found the 
Consumer  Non-Cyclical  and  the  Industrial  with  relative  spread  errors  of  –86%  and  –95%, 
respectively. The poor performance in the Industrial sector seems to be due to the short average   24 
maturity of its bonds (5.8 years, which is the lowest of the sample) and the low asset volatility 
of its firms. As regards the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector it seems to be due to the reduced 
asset volatility of its firms. 
  We can summarize the analysis of the predictions errors as follows. Both the Merton and 
Leland models overestimate bond prices and under-estimate credit spreads. Even though in the 
spread  predictions  the  results  are  not  statistically  different  from  each  other,  in  the  prices 
predictions Merton’s overestimation is stronger. We also confirm the Eom et al. (2004) results 
of high dispersion of credit spread errors. The analysis of the prediction errors by category 
shows that both the Merton and Leland models perform better for bonds with a good rating 
quality and a longer maturity. Moreover, these models perform better with riskier firms, those 
that present high asset volatility and high leverage. 
 
5.3 Systematic Prediction Errors 
Up  to  this  point  we  have  discussed  the  performance  of  the  structural  models  analysing 
essentially  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  predicted  errors  in  terms  of  pricing,  yield  and 
spread. We considered the mean relative spread error to be the most informative measure of the 
ability of the models to fit credit spreads. In this section, we consider in more detail the question 
of  why  the  models’  predictions  are  inaccurate.  With  a  multivariate  regression  analysis  we 
examine the relationship between the relative spread error and a set of bond-specific, firm-
specific and economy-wide variables. The goal is to identify some systematic factors that cause 
the  weaknesses  of  the  models.  This  analysis  covers  the  entire  sample  as  well  as  several 
categories of rating, maturity, asset volatility and sector. 
  The methodology used in this section is somewhat similar to the methodology used by 
Eom  et  al.  (2004),  Ericsson  and  Reneby  (2002)  and  Lyden  and  Saraniti  (2000).  All  these 
authors perform a multivariate regression analysis instead of a single regression analysis. They 
argue that a combination of factors leads to higher or lower prediction errors and, therefore, 
analysis in a multivariate regression setting is more appropriate. Nevertheless, there are some 
differences in the choice of the dependent variable. Eom et al. (2004) use the relative spread   25 
error  as  the  dependent  variable  while  Ericsson  and  Reneby  (2002)  and  Lyden  and  Saraniti 
(2000) use the absolute spread error. But, even the spread error is not defined in the same way 
by all these studies. While the first two use the definition of error as we do, Lyden and Saraniti 
(2000) use an inverse definition, which leads to positive errors for these models
11. Following the 
most recent empirical paper in the field (Eom et al., 2004), we use the relative spread error as 
dependent variable, which makes our findings directly comparable to that study.  
  In the list of explanatory variables we consider size, leverage, asset volatility, market-to-
book ratio and stock return as firm-specific variables. We use the market value of assets as a 
proxy for size. Leverage is the market leverage, defined as the ratio of the sum of market value 
of trade debt and book value of non-traded by the market value of assets. We use the definition 
of market-to-book ratio presented by Rajan and Zingales (1995) as the ratio of market value of 
assets  to  book  value  of  assets.  This  variable  in  intended  to  stand  for  the  firm’s  growth 
opportunities. The stock return is computed as the annualized stock return of the last 250 days 
prior to the quarter considered for each firm
12. 
  As bond-specific variables we use the remaining time to maturity of the bonds, the rating 
and  the  observed  yield  to  maturity.  Since  each  regression  is  estimated  using  bond  prices 
observed in a variety of interest rate environments we consider two control variables related to 
term structure. The ten-year yield is used to measure the level of the term structure and the 
difference between the ten and two year yields to measure the slope.  
 
5.3.1 Credit Spread Regression 
As a first check on our explanatory variables, we ran a regression with the market spread as the 
dependent variable. In this case we only considered a group of six independent variables that we 
                                                 
11 Recall that we define relative spread error as the difference between the predicted spread minus the 
observed spread divided by the observed spread. 
12 We also evaluate whether we should consider the tangibility of a firm’s assets in the list of firm-specific 
variables. As proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), the tangibility can be approximated by the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. However, we decided not to include this variable as it presents a strong 
association with leverage, one of our explanatory variables. The inclusion of both variables could create 
multicollinearity problems in our regressions.
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consider to be the most relevant for the explanation of observed credit spread, namely size, 
leverage, years to maturity, asset volatility, rating and market-to-book ratio. This is reported as 
credit spread regression in Table 4.  
  From  the  six  parameters  considered  in  the  credit  spread  regression,  only  maturity  and 
market-to-book ratio are not statistically significant. The others show a sign that is consistent 
with the results found by Ericsson and Reneby (2002). The negative sign of the size parameter 
reveals that bigger firms have lower spreads. This happens essentially for two reasons. First, 
bigger firms are considered to be safer firms and thus have low default risk. This is in some 
sense reinforced by the negative correlation between rating and size (–0.33), meaning that small 
firms are more likely to have speculative grade bonds and thus, more default risk. Secondly, 
bonds belonging to bigger firms  are  considered to be  more liquid than bonds belonging to 
smaller firms. This means that the market spread should be lower for bigger firms since this 
spread does not have to provide a high compensation for liquidity, as is the case of smaller 
firms. Liquidity really seems to be one reason to explain the sign of the size parameter. Our 
study is also in accordance with Gabbi and Sironi’s (2005) which states the great importance of 
bond rating as a determinant of yield spreads. 
  Using the Eom et al. (2004) definition of safer firms (with low leverage and low asset 
volatility) we found that safer firms have low credit spreads. Note the high sensitivity of credit 
spread to leverage and asset volatility, as the parameters for these two variables in regression 2 
are 341.318 and 327.076, respectively. In accordance with the previous results we also verify 
that low quality rating is strongly associated with higher spreads (as the coefficient for rating 
presents a value of 34.132).  
 
5.3.2 Errors Regressions 
Having analysed some explanatory variables of the credit spread we shall now make some 
considerations about the spread error regressions presented in Table 4. We focus the analysis on 
regression 2 as these include only significant parameters. The first conclusion that we can draw 
from  these  regressions  is  that  these  models  under-estimate  credit  spreads.  We  had  already   27 
reached this conclusion when analysing the mean values of the relative spread errors in the 
previous section and now we confirm it by verifying that the intercept coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. The lower coefficient found for the  Merton model (–2.111 against 
–1.661 in Leland) seems to indicate that the Merton model under-estimates the credit spread 
more than the Leland model but, as we mentioned in the previous section, this difference is not 
statistically significant.  
  In  the  list  of  firm  specific  variables,  four  of  the  five  variables  have  a  systematic 
relationship  with  the  Merton  spread  error:  namely  leverage,  asset  volatility,  market-to-book 
ratio and stock return. In the Leland model, size also bears some relationship with the errors but, 
on the other hand, stock return has no influence in explaining these errors. Our results indicate 
that both models under-estimate less the spread for riskier firms, i.e. firms with high leverage 
and high volatility. Again, this is more evident for the Merton model.  
  During the estimation procedure we notice that the adjusted R
2 decreases greatly when we 
dropped the asset volatility from the list of explanatory variables. This confirms the extreme 
importance of this variable in explaining the relative spread errors of the Merton model, in line 
with the findings of Eom et al (2004). These authors find that Merton’s errors are systematically 
related  to  asset  volatility  in  all  their  regressions.  Moreover,  this  pattern  reveals  that  these 
structural models have many problems in explaining the observed market spreads due to their 
simplifying assumptions about reality. All the models discussed in this paper assume constant 
asset volatility. The introduction of a stochastic process for volatility would probably benefit the 
performance of these models, as the estimation results depend considerably on the value found 
(and assumed) for asset volatility.  
  In  Leland’s  results  the  under-estimation  is  also  lower  for  bigger  firms,  which  is  in 
accordance with the earlier discussion about liquidity risk. Furthermore, the negative coefficient 
of  the  market-to-book  ratio  variable  indicates  that  the  under-estimation  bias  is  stronger  in 
companies with high levels of growth opportunities. We believe that this is due to the fact that 
companies with high growth opportunities usually have less leverage and, as previous empirical 
results also suggest, these models have a worst performance in low leverage firms.    28 
  As regards the bond-specific variables, only maturity and observed yield to maturity play a 
role in explaining the spread errors. Longer maturity bonds are subject to less under-estimation 
of the models. The difficulty these models have in predicting high spreads for short maturity 
bonds is well known. On the other hand, the regression analysis does not confirm the better 
capacity  of  these  models  to  predict  spreads  of  high  rating  bonds,  as  we  concluded  in  the 
predictions errors section.  
  The  only  term  structure  parameter  that  has  a  statistically  significant  relationship  with 
Merton’s spread errors is the level. The higher the level of the term structure the lower is the 
under-estimation of the structural models. Despite this empirical relationship, the reasons for 
that are not obvious. In a previous study where this variable was used (Eom et al., 2004), it was 
not found to be statistically significant. This was the only variable in our results that did not 
match with the results of Eom et al. (2004). All other parameters previously discussed presented 
the same sign and absolute values not so different from theirs. This certainly reinforces our 
study  since  we  use  a  smaller  sample.  Moreover,  the  high  R
2  of  our  regressions  should  be 
noticed. 
  In  addition  to  the  above  regressions  that  apply  to  the  total  sample  we  also  ran  some 
regressions  according  to  the  categories  presented  in  Section  4,  namely  different  classes  of 
rating, maturities, asset volatility and sectors. The results did not improve the analysis already 
done for the total sample. Thus, we do not report these estimations.  
 
5.4 The Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt-equity swap 
In our approach to the Fan and Sundaresan debt–equity swap we do not differentiate firms 
according  to  the  bargaining  power  of  equityholders  and  debtholders  at  liquidation.  This  is 
clearly a simplistic assumption but makes possible a comparative static’s analysis regarding 
some variables of this model, as presented in Figure 2. It shows the sensitivity of the bankruptcy 
threshold, debt, equity and firm value to the bargaining power parameter. By assigning more 
bargaining power to equityholders (as h approximates 1) we benefit the equityholders but the 
decrease in debt value is such that after a certain point (in this case when h is higher than 0.5)   29 
there is a loss in the firm’s value. Thus, the solution presented in Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1996)  where  equityholders  have  all  the  bargaining  power  is  not  the  most  efficient.  The 
company benefits more if there is some balance between the bargaining power of its claimants.  
  Our calibration of the Fan and Sundaresan debt/equity swap is made assuming a bargaining 
power parameter of 0.5, as this is the parameter that maximizes the firm value in our sample. 
With this new “real world feature” we should expect Fan and Sundaresan’s model to outperform 
the Leland model. This is indeed verified in our estimation, as show the results of Table 5.   
  The  assumption  of  an  equal  distribution  of  bargaining  power  among  firms  seems  to 
approximate the Fan and Sundaresan predictions to the market values, as we observe that the 
mean relative pricing error and the mean relative yield error are almost zero (a mean zero test 
performed on these means indicates that they are statistically equal to zero, considering a 5% 
significance level). Furthermore, the relative spread error decreases from –75.0% in the Leland 
model  to  –64.9%  in  the  Fan  and  Sundaresan  model.  This  improvement  is  just  due  to  the 
consideration of the bargaining power parameter since Fan and Sundaresan’s debt/equity swap 
is identical to Leland’s model when we assume that debtholders have all the power.  These 
results confirm the importance of debt renegotiation in a firm’s financing decisions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tests empirically the performance of three corporate bond pricing models using a 
sample of 50 bonds from companies with simple capital structures between 2001 and 2004. In 
particular, we implement the models of Merton (1974), Leland (1994), and Fan and Sundaresan 
(2000)  debt–equity  swap.  We  analyse  the  prediction  errors  in  price,  yield  and  spread  as 
measures of the performance of the models and then we examine whether there are systematic 
factors that can explain the relative spread errors. The discussion incorporates a decomposition 
of the companies by sector, which is new in relation to most recent empirical studies in the field. 
  While the Merton and Leland models overestimate bond prices, Fan and Sundaresan’s 
model  does  not  reveal  bias  in  the  estimation  of  these  prices,  as  we  cannot  reject  the  null 
hypothesis of mean zero in Fan and Sundaresan pricing errors. We find relative price errors of   30 
11.2%,  4.5%  and  0.5%  for  the  three  models,  respectively.  These  results  suggest  that  the 
introduction of early default, coupons, taxes and bankruptcy cost in the Leland model and the 
assumption  of  a  bargaining  power  parameter  in  Fan  and  Sundaresan’s  model  is  a  major 
improvement in Merton’s pricing framework.  
  If we rely on relative spread errors as a measure of the model’s performance, we conclude 
that the three models under-estimate credit spreads. We  find  relative spread errors of –76.2%, 
–75.0%  and  –64.9%  for  the  Merton,  Leland  and  Fan  and  Sundaresan  models,  respectively. 
However,  this  measure  does  not  confirm  the  differences  between  Merton  and  Leland’s 
predictions to be statistically significant. Furthermore, we find a high dispersion of both the 
observed credit spread and the predicted spreads. These models can either predict very low 
spreads or very high spreads, depending considerably in the estimation of asset volatility. This 
might reveal the importance of assuming a stochastic process for asset volatility. 
  An analysis of the prediction errors by category reveals the existence of important rating, 
maturity, volatility and sector effects. Both Merton’s and Leland’s models perform better in 
bonds with a good rating quality. The lower liquidity of speculative grade bonds seems to be 
one of the main reasons why these models under-estimate more the credit spreads of these 
bonds.  Our  results  also  clarify  the  Eom  et  al.  (2004)  analysis  of  rating.  Furthermore,  they 
confirm  Ericsson  and  Reneby  (2002),  who  report  greater  bias  of  their  structural  model  for 
speculative grade bonds. We confirm the better performance of these models in bonds with 
longer maturity and in riskier firms (high leverage and high asset volatility). The decomposition 
of the spread prediction errors by sector allows us to verify that both the Merton and Leland 
models fit better spreads in the Consumer Cyclical and Energy sectors as the bonds in these 
sectors have longer maturities and belong to firms with high leverage and high asset volatility. 
In the bottom line we find the Consumer Non-Cyclical and Industrial sectors. 
  We find empirical evidence that the market spread is positively related with leverage and 
asset volatility. In addition, it is higher in bonds with low rating quality. However, we cannot 
validate an empirical relationship between credit spread and both maturity and market-to-book 
ratio. Among the firm-specific factors that can explain spread errors we find the leverage, asset   31 
volatility, market-to-book ratio, stock return and size (this last one only in Leland’s errors). As 
regards the bond-specific variables we conclude that the errors are systematically related to 
maturity and yield to maturity. While the level of term structure has a systematic influence in 
the spread errors of all models, the slope only has impact in Leland’s errors.  
  In  summary,  the  difficulty  these  structural  models  have  in  accurately  predicting  bond 
prices and credit spreads is clear. However, this depends on several bond- and firm-specific 
features, as well as according to market conditions. A challenge for future research is thus, from 
a theoretical point of view, the development of tractable structural bond pricing models that are 
able to better fit credit spreads and bond prices. Future empirical research should try to extend 
the industrial analysis of the performance of these models, incorporating other industries, and 
evaluating  whether  these  models  perform  differently  according  to  country,  as  the  market 
conditions can vary significantly across countries.  
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Issue Date Maturity Coupon  Rating
Yield 
Spread (bp)
Industrial       219.3 6.803% 191.2
Bond 1 100 28/06/1995 01/07/2005 6.700% A 149.7
Bond 2 250 07/08/2001 15/08/2008 6.500% A 114.5
CNF Inc Bond 1 200 03/03/2000 01/05/2010 8.875% BBB- 374.1
IDEX Corp Bond 1 150 18/02/1998 15/02/2008 6.875% BBB 293.3
Pentair Inc Bond 1 250 30/09/1999 15/10/2009 7.850% BBB 247.5
Bond 1 200 14/08/2001 15/08/2011 6.250% A 107.7
Bond 2 100 28/09/1995 01/10/2005 6.625% A 119.0
Bond 1 300 24/02/1999 01/03/2009 6.750% BBB 238.5
Bond 2 100 04/09/1992 15/09/2004 7.250% BBB 301.0
Bond 1 500 24/04/2002 15/05/2012 6.100% A 75.7
Bond 2 400 23/10/2001 01/11/2006 4.875% A 73.1
Bond 1 150 19/04/2000 15/04/2010 8.500% BBB+ 283.2
Bond 2 100 29/04/1999 01/05/2009 6.500% BBB+ 236.7
Bond 1 250 07/04/1999 01/04/2009 6.000% A+ 132.6
Bond 2 240 02/02/2001 01/02/2006 6.400% A+ 121.6
Consumer Cyclical 230.0 6.873% 250.3
Choice Hotels Int. Inc Bond 1 100 19/10/1998 01/05/2008 7.125% BBB- 339.7
Knight Ridder Inc Bond 1 300 23/03/1999 15/03/2029 6.875% A 148.1
Bond 1 125 21/05/1998 01/06/2028 7.125% BBB 223.5
Bond 2 125 21/05/1998 01/06/2008 6.650% BBB 195.8
Bond 1 300 11/03/1998 15/03/2028 6.950% A- 200.9
Bond 2 250 14/01/1999 15/01/2009 5.625% A- 175.5
Bond 1 200 07/08/1997 15/08/2007 7.125% BBB- 224.2
Bond 2 325 25/09/2002 01/10/2012 7.375% BBB- 129.2
Bond 3 325 26/02/2003 01/10/2012 7.375% BBB- 102.2
Unifi Inc Bond 1 250 05/02/1998 01/02/2008 6.500% B+ 763.8
Energy 188.9 7.286% 209.7
Bond 1 150 19/12/2000 15/12/2010 7.625% A- 188.0
Bond 2 100 24/02/1998 15/02/2028 7.125% A- 234.0
Bond 1 150 20/11/1997 15/11/2027 7.200% BBB+ 171.7
Bond 2 150 20/11/1997 15/11/2007 6.750% BBB+ 151.5
Bond 1 250 29/04/1999 01/05/2029 7.050% A- 148.7
Bond 2 350 29/04/2002 01/05/2012 6.375% A- 110.0
Bond 1 125 17/11/1997 15/10/2007 7.450% BB+ 292.6
Bond 2 175 21/02/2001 01/03/2011 7.625% BB+ 273.3
Bond 3 250 08/08/2002 15/08/2012 8.375% BB+ 317.3
Basic Materials 189.3 6.332% 247.0
Bond 1 100 15/06/1995 15/06/2025 7.250% BB+ 189.8
Bond 2 200 20/11/1998 01/12/2008 5.875% BB+ 159.4
Bond 1 175 07/01/1999 01/01/2009 6.000% A+ 157.5
Bond 2 350 26/09/2002 01/10/2012 4.875% A+ 67.5
Sensient Technologies  Bond 1 150 22/03/1999 01/04/2009 6.500% BBB- 240.5
Bond 1 150 09/12/1997 01/12/2009 6.700% BBB 470.5
Bond 2 200 21/05/1996 15/05/2006 7.125% BBB 443.6
Healthcare 208.8 6.800% 171.7
Bond 1 235 14/11/2001 15/11/2011 6.875% BBB 142.0
Bond 2 100 23/05/1996 01/06/2026 7.050% BBB 100.8
Guidant Corp Bond 1 350 11/02/1999 15/02/2006 6.150% A- 148.6
Watson Pharmaceutical Bond 1 150 13/05/1998 15/05/2008 7.125% BBB- 295.5
Consumer Non Cyclical 161.0 7.580% 279.9
Bond 1 150 24/09/1999 01/10/2009 7.900% BBB- 274.4
Bond 2 100 20/10/2003 01/11/2013 5.500% BBB- 90.9
Bond 1 200 18/08/1999 15/08/2009 8.450% BBB- 401.4
Bond 2 255 28/06/2002 15/07/2007 8.250% BBB- 340.7
Toro Co Bond 1 100 15/06/1997 15/06/2027 7.800% BBB- 292.2
All Bonds                      Average 205.1 6.916% 221.5
Sd 92.7 0.852% 125.5
Max 500 8.875% 763.8
Min 100 4.875% 67.5
Blyth Inc


























Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics for the bonds in the sample. All the information 
regarding face value, issue date, maturity date, coupon and yield spread was obtained from 
DATASTREAM. The yield spread for each bond is an average of the spread over US 
treasury bills for the sample period. Rating information was obtained from Standard & 



























Bemis Co Inc 2,567.6 1,191.2 3,758.8 31.7% 53.8% 32.1% 4.4 25.9% 2.3%
CNF Inc 1,560.8 2,123.4 3,684.2 57.6% 73.8% 10.2% 7.4 37.0% 1.3%
IDEX Corp 1,107.9 418.0 1,525.9 27.4% 45.3% 37.0% 5.4 33.2% 1.7%
Pentair Inc 2,023.1 1,443.3 3,466.4 41.6% 55.7% 18.9% 6.9 35.9% 2.0%
Snap-on Inc 1,675.4 1,201.1 2,876.6 41.8% 57.5% 26.2% 5.9 28.3% 3.5%
Temple Inland Inc 2,646.9 2,796.4 5,443.3 51.4% 58.3% 15.0% 4.1 31.2% 2.7%
United Techonologies 33,857.8 20,998.5 54,856.3 38.3% 68.5% 4.1% 6.9 38.1% 1.6%
USF Corp 846.7 719.4 1,566.1 45.9% 52.2% 37.3% 6.9 41.6% 1.2%
Vulcan Materials 4,231.4 1,856.5 6,088.0 30.5% 52.1% 28.0% 4.9 29.0% 2.3%
Average 5,613.1 3,638.6 9,251.7 40.7% 57.5% 23.2% 5.8 33.3% 2.1%
Consumer Cyclical
Choice Hotels Int. Inc 988.7 418.4 1,407.0 29.7% 100.0% 24.3% 5.4 45.8% 0.4%
Knight Ridder Inc 5,304.0 2,632.4 7,936.3 33.2% 63.5% 12.0% 26.4 23.6% 1.7%
Neiman Marcus Group 1,018.4 934.0 1,952.5 47.8% 45.6% 27.6% 15.4 34.7% 0.1%
Nordstrom Inc 3,132.5 2,797.9 5,930.5 47.2% 66.7% 19.7% 15.6 42.9% 1.8%
Staples Inc 9,348.2 2,758.3 12,106.5 22.8% 51.0% 19.0% 7.2 44.8% 0.1%
Unifi Inc 359.7 465.9 825.6 56.4% 50.6% 45.2% 5.4 68.9% 0.0%
Average 3,358.6 1,667.8 5,026.4 39.5% 55.5% 24.6% 12.5 43.5% 0.7%
Energy
Energen Corporation 1,058.7 905.5 1,964.2 46.1% 59.7% 29.6% 16.6 30.4% 2.4%
Ensco International 3,762.5 1,043.2 4,805.7 21.7% 36.1% 31.0% 14.9 48.8% 0.4%
Murphy Oil Corp 4,449.3 2,379.7 6,828.9 34.8% 57.7% 22.4% 17.7 32.4% 1.7%
Newfield Exploration 1,849.2 1,196.3 3,045.4 39.3% 54.1% 38.2% 7.7 31.8% 0.0%
Average 2,779.9 1,381.2 4,161.1 35.5% 51.9% 30.3% 14.2 35.9% 1.1%
Basic Materials
Lubrizol Corp 1,639.4 975.5 2,614.9 37.3% 52.4% 31.9% 14.1 28.6% 3.3%
Nucor Corp 3,918.2 1,905.1 5,823.4 32.7% 45.0% 18.7% 8.1 42.1% 1.6%
Sensient Technologies  994.8 776.9 1,771.6 43.9% 60.7% 19.9% 6.4 28.7% 2.7%
Worthington Industries  1,275.3 835.5 2,110.7 39.6% 57.5% 40.2% 5.5 39.4% 4.4%
Average 1,956.9 1,123.2 3,080.2 38.4% 53.9% 27.7% 8.5 34.7% 3.0%
Healthcare
Beckman Coulter Inc 2,700.1 1,649.8 4,349.9 37.9% 71.3% 21.0% 16.1 32.3% 0.9%
Guidant Corp 13,322.7 1,543.9 14,866.5 10.4% 41.2% 24.4% 3.4 40.8% 0.3%
Watson Pharmaceutical 3,807.1 1,012.7 4,819.7 21.0% 35.2% 15.6% 5.4 45.9% 0.0%
Average 6,609.9 1,402.1 8,012.1 23.1% 49.2% 20.3% 8.3 39.6% 0.4%
Consumer Non Cyclical
Blyth Inc 1,260.2 425.1 1,685.3 25.2% 43.7% 42.5% 8.4 31.4% 0.9%
Corn Products Int. Inc 1,141.0 1,282.8 2,423.8 52.9% 58.8% 30.9% 5.6 27.5% 1.3%
Toro Co 873.0 535.0 1,408.0 38.0% 57.9% 18.9% 24.9 28.8% 0.7%
Average 1,091.4 747.6 1,839.0 38.7% 53.5% 30.8% 13.0 29.2% 1.0%
All Firms
Average 3,886.9 2,042.1 5,929.0 37.4% 56.1% 25.6% 9.7 36.2% 1.5%
Sd 6,382.3 3,723.3 9,938.2 11.2% 12.7% 10.1% 6.2 9.3% 1.2%
Max 33,857.8 20,998.5 54,856.3 57.6% 100.0% 45.2% 26.4 68.9% 4.4%
Min 359.7 418.0 825.6 10.4% 35.2% 4.1% 3.4 23.6% 0.0%
A.2 – Firms Summary Statistics 
 
 
Table A.2 reports descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. All the figures are an average of the 
quarterly observations for each company (third quarter of 2001 until first quarter of 2004). All market 
values are expressed in million dollars. The market value of equity and dividend yield for each quarter was 
obtained from DATASTREAM as well as stock prices required to compute stock volatility. Stock volatility 
for each quarter is the annualised stock volatility. It was computed using a series of daily log returns from 
the  last  250  trading  days  proceeding  each  quarter.  Daily  stock  prices  were  also  obtained  from 
DATASTREAM. The market value of total liabilities is the sum of the market value of traded bonds and 
book value of other liabilities.  



































































































A.3 – Nelson-Siegel (1987) model 
For  each  quarter  we  use  price  information  of  the  U.S.  Treasury  Strips  obtained  from 
DATASTREAM. This method allows for smoothing the yields of the strips into a continuous 
yield curve. Given the price of the Treasury Strip Ps and its maturity T, the continuous spot 








=                      (A.3.1) 
For the same date, the estimated spot curve given by the Nelson-Siegel (1987) model is 






















+ + = Q                   (A.3.2) 
where  ( ) 1 2 1 0 , , , t b b b = Qr .  In  order  to  fit  the  model  with  the  Treasury  Strips  yields,  one 
chooses the parameters in  r Q such that the sum of squared errors is minimized, where the error 
is the difference between the model yield and the observed spot yield.  
 
A.4 - Distribution of Market Spread: Total Sample 
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A.5 – P-Values to Test Mean Zero of the Merton and Leland Relative Errors 
Table A.5 reports the P-values for a two-tailed test, which test the following hypothesis for the mean 
relative error. H0: m = 0 and  H1: m ¹ 0. The values in bolt refer to cases where we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the mean relative error is zero for a 5% significance level. 
 





Table A.6 reports the P-values for a two-tailed test, which test the 
following  hypothesis  for  the  differences  in  Merton  and  Leland 
means relative errors. H0: m
Merton - m
Leland = 0 and  H1: m
Merton - 
m
Leland ¹ 0. The values in bolt refer to cases where the equality of 
means does hold for a 5% significance level. 
MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND
ALL SAMPLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.0000
INDUSTRIAL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0093 0.0000 0.0000
CONSUMER, CYCLICAL 0.0000 0.4869 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ENERGY 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BASIC MATERIALS 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0498 0.0000 0.0000
HEALTHCARE 0.0000 0.1309 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
HIGH RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1236 0.0000 0.0000
LOW RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SHORT MATURITY 0.0000 0.3127 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MEDIUM MATURITY 0.0000 0.0176 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
LONG MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LOW VOLATILITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000








ALL SAMPLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.6779
INDUSTRIAL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0538
CONSUMER, CYCLICAL 0.0000 0.0003 0.0728
ENERGY 0.0552 0.0009 0.3472
BASIC MATERIALS 0.0001 0.0000 0.5249
HEALTHCARE 0.0000 0.0000 0.1646
CONSUMER, NON-CYCLICAL 0.5460 0.0000 0.9354
HIGH RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.7480
LOW RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.7739
SHORT MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MEDIUM MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.2162
LONG MATURITY 0.2787 0.0023 0.0195
LOW VOLATILITY 0.0412 0.0000 0.0366























MERTON Mean 28.1 8.9% -155.3 -26.3% -155.3 -72.9%
Sd 24.0 7.7% 144.3 18.7% 144.3 41.8%
LELAND Mean 7.3 3.3% -23.4 3.0% -153.7 -71.6%
Sd 35.7 9.7% 141.9 27.7% 125.9 35.1%
MERTON Mean 34.2 14.8% -251.3 -37.3% -251.3 -81.5%
Sd 26.8 9.6% 143.5 16.9% 143.5 28.7%
LELAND Mean 15.1 6.5% -115.6 -13.8% -258.8 -80.6%





A.7 – P-Values to Test No Category Effects in the Merton and Leland Relative Errors 
Table A.7 reports the P-values for a two-way ANOVA test, which evaluates the following 
hypothesis for the means of relative errors in the Merton and Leland models. 
H0: m
High Rating  = m
Low Rating = 0 and  H1: otherwise.  
H0: m
Short Maturity  = m
Medium Maturity = m
Long Maturity = 0 and  H1: otherwise. 
H0: m
Low Asset Volatility   = m
High Asset Volatility = 0 and  H1: otherwise.  
H0: m
Industrial  = mConsumer Cyclical = mEnergy = mBasic Materials = mHealthcare = mConsumer 
Non-Cyclical = 0 and  H1: otherwise. 
The values in bolt refer to cases where there are not category effects for a 5% significance level. 
 
A.8 – Performance of the Merton and Leland Model According to Categories 
                                   (Continues next page) 
MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND
SECTORS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009
RATING 0.0000 0.0257 0.0000 0.0000 0.0464 0.0128
MATURITY 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1258




















MERTON Mean 24.5 8.0% -206.7 -40.7% -206.7 -97.0%
Sd 16.8 6.6% 155.7 11.7% 155.7 6.8%
LELAND Mean 1.4 0.9% 45.2 22.4% -184.3 -82.6%
Sd 22.4 6.4% 175.8 34.4% 165.3 15.6%
MERTON Mean 31.4 11.3% -229.4 -34.5% -229.4 -77.4%
Sd 26.2 7.3% 159.6 19.5% 159.6 37.8%
LELAND Mean 5.2 2.0% -70.5 -5.8% -225.5 -72.4%
Sd 38.9 11.1% 147.2 22.9% 147.1 35.4%
MERTON Mean 31.8 12.6% -120.7 -18.4% -120.7 -63.9%
Sd 26.7 11.7% 102.6 13.7% 102.6 41.2%
LELAND Mean 23.4 10.6% -89.6 -12.1% -144.5 -75.7%










MATURITY  38 
A.8 – Performance of the Merton and Leland Models According to Categories (cont.) 
 
Table A.8 reports the absolute and relative errors in price, yield and spread for the Merton and Leland 
models for different categories of rating, maturity, asset volatility and sectors. The absolute errors in 
prices, yields and spreads are calculated as the predicted prices, yields and spreads minus the observed 
values of these variables. The relative errors are computed as the absolute errors divided by the observed 













MERTON Mean 27.7 9.4% -180.3 -32.5% -180.3 -86.0%
Sd 14.7 6.4% 108.4 14.0% 108.4 26.7%
LELAND Mean 6.7 3.7% -2.7 7.3% -170.9 -77.6%
Sd 27.4 7.1% 135.8 28.0% 109.5 33.4%
MERTON Mean 27.8 10.7% -162.1 -22.3% -162.1 -58.0%
Sd 27.9 9.8% 178.0 19.7% 178.0 41.8%
LELAND Mean 4.4 1.3% -96.5 -10.8% -203.2 -68.9%
Sd 44.4 15.0% 146.1 15.9% 166.9 25.5%
MERTON Mean 42.8 10.6% -135.2 -21.8% -135.2 -62.5%
Sd 37.6 8.3% 115.8 18.0% 115.8 43.1%
LELAND Mean 27.2 6.5% -69.0 -10.1% -150.3 -70.2%
Sd 45.1 11.3% 88.5 13.6% 100.1 33.2%
MERTON Mean 31.4 12.5% -275.1 -37.7% -275.1 -80.6%
Sd 27.1 8.3% 213.5 23.3% 213.5 47.0%
LELAND Mean 4.7 4.1% -97.6 -7.8% -251.2 -74.6%
Sd 36.8 10.2% 179.7 25.9% 189.6 40.2%
MERTON Mean 18.1 6.8% -143.0 -29.3% -143.0 -77.1%
Sd 11.9 4.4% 81.4 16.5% 81.4 33.7%
LELAND Mean -5.4 -2.5% 41.5 14.7% -118.8 -66.8%
Sd 24.2 9.5% 102.0 31.1% 65.4 24.9%
MERTON Mean 38.4 20.5% -302.5 -43.9% -302.5 -95.1%
Sd 23.6 12.0% 101.3 12.6% 101.3 5.8%
LELAND Mean 33.1 18.6% -184.1 -24.1% -301.6 -95.0%
























MERTON Mean 39.6 13.6% -202.9 -33.6% -202.9 -93.4%
Sd 25.2 9.4% 125.4 13.3% 125.4 7.8%
LELAND Mean 31.3 11.3% -72.4 -6.4% -196.2 -91.4%
Sd 26.1 10.2% 138.2 25.0% 109.9 8.5%
MERTON Mean 22.0 8.9% -181.9 -27.6% -181.9 -60.3%
Sd 22.1 7.9% 171.4 22.3% 171.4 46.1%
LELAND Mean -9.1 -1.7% -45.9 -0.6% -191.6 -60.0%








VOLATILITY  39 
1-Year Default 
Rates (1999)
Merton Leland Moody's Maturity Rating
All Conpanies  Mean 12.3% 10.5% 0.11% 9.9 9.6
n = 317 Sd 13.7% 10.4% 6.4 2.0
Industrial  Mean 7.8% 7.9% 0,00%-0,11% 5.8 8.6
n = 98 Sd 9.2% 6.1% 1.4 1.7
Consumer Cyclical Mean 22.9% 17.4% 0,11%-1,12% 12.5 10.3
n = 66 Sd 18.6% 15.0% 7.6 2.6
Energy Mean 17.1% 10.1% 0.11% 14.8 9.3
n = 44 Sd 13.2% 9.3% 5.2 1.7
Basic Materials Mean 8.1% 10.6% 0.11% 8.6 9.7
n = 43 Sd 8.4% 8.4% 3.5 2.3
Healthcare Mean 8.4% 11.8% 0.11% 8.5 9.7
n = 33 Sd 11.1% 10.2% 6.3 1.3
Consumer Non-Cyclical  Mean 7.1% 3.6% 0,11%-1,12% 12.7 11.0
n = 33 Sd 7.4% 2.7% 8.8 0.0
AVERAGE RNDP
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics of Spreads: Market, Models and Merrill Lynch 
While the market spread and the Merton and Leland predicted spreads are averages for the sample 
period, the Merrill Lynch spread is just an approximation of spreads considering certain intervals of 
years to maturity and rating of the bonds. The original study in which we based the Merrill Lynch 
spread  presents  averages  spreads  over  the  period  January  1997-August  2003  for  U.S.  corporate 
bonds and was obtained from Bloomberg.  
 










Source of Moody’s 1-year default rates: Duffie and Singleton (2003). 
 
 




All Firms Mean 221.5 58.9 57.1 169.3 9.9 9.6
n = 317 Sd 125.5 111.5 74.7 6.4 2.0
Industrial  Mean 191.2 26.8 36.2 148.0 5.8 8.6
n = 98 Sd 92.1 47.2 33.5 1.4 1.7
Consumer Cyclical Mean 250.3 149.3 108.3 203.4 12.5 10.3
n = 66 Sd 182.0 191.4 119.5 7.6 2.6
Energy Mean 209.7 69.9 54.8 169.3 14.8 9.3
n = 44 Sd 68.4 83.8 62.0 5.2 1.7
Basic Materials Mean 247.0 27.4 51.3 169.3 8.6 9.7
n = 43 Sd 141.3 45.4 47.5 3.5 2.3
Healthcare Mean 171.7 44.8 69.0 169.3 8.5 9.7
n = 33 Sd 73.8 73.8 75.4 6.3 1.3
Consumer Non-Cyclical  Mean 279.9 14.2 15.2 227.2 12.7 11.0
n = 33 Sd 104.3 14.7 12.3 8.8 0.0













MERTON  Mean 30.4 11.2% -191.9 -30.5% -191.9 -76.2%
Sd 25.2 8.9% 151.2 18.8% 151.2 37.5%
LELAND Mean 10.3 4.5% -58.6 -3.4% -193.8 -75.0%
Sd 36.4 12.3% 148.8 25.7% 140.2 31.1%
PRICE YIELD SPREAD
ALL SAMPLE
 Table 3 – Performance of the Merton and Leland Models - Total Sample 
Table 3 reports the absolute and relative errors in price, yield and spread for the Merton and Leland 
models. The absolute errors in prices, yields and spreads are calculated as the predicted prices, yields 
and spreads minus the observed values of these variables. The relative errors are computed as the 
absolute errors divided by the observed prices, yields or spreads.  
 
Table 4 – Regression of Credit Spread and Relative Spread Errors: Total Sample 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2
Intercept -290.832 -250.831 -2.065 -2.111 -1.641 -1.661
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.343) (0.020) (0.014)
Leverage 373.623 341.318 1.927 1.821 1.445 1.452
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Yrs to Maturity 1.003 0.019 0.018 0.010 0.010
(0.543) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Volatility 322.267 327.076 3.461 3.470 3.362 3.370
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rating 34.903 34.132 0.008 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.399) (0.767)
Mk-to-Book Ratio 6.962 -0.041 -0.041 -0.044 -0.044
(0.602) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Return 0.119 0.118 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.925)
Observed YTM -9.765 -8.636 -9.185 -9.318
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Level of Term Structure 6.470 5.821 5.928 6.050
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Slope of Term Structure -6.058 -6.239 -6.472
(0.079) (0.037) (0.026)
Adj. Rsq 0.35 0.34 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84
ANOVA F statistics 27.74 41.65 156.96 222.55 166.15 208.96
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Independent 
Variables
Dependent variables: observed credit spread for "CREDIT SPREAD" and relative 
spread error of the bond pricing model for "MERTON" and "LELAND" 
CREDIT SPREAD  MERTON LELAND
 
Table 4 reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in parentheses). In the ANOVA F 
statistics section all the values in parenthesis also correspond to p-values. Regression 1 
includes  all  explanatory  variables  (with  significant  and  non-significant  parameters)  and 
regression  2  includes  only  variables  with  significant  parameters,  considering  a  5% 
significance level. We always start our estimation with regression 1 and then regression 2 is 
obtained  using  a  backward  elimination  strategy.  All  regressions  are  corrected  for 

























LELAND Mean 10.3 4.5% -58.6 -3.4% -193.8 -75.0%
Sd 36.4 12.3% 148.8 25.7% 140.2 31.1%
FAN & SUNDARESAN Mean -2.8 0.5% -33.5 0.4% -168.7 -64.9%
Sd 39.5 13.0% 143.4 25.8% 133.2 37.0%
ALL SAMPLE
PRICE YIELD SPREAD






Table 5 reports the absolute and relative errors in price, yield and spread for the Merton model and 
Fan  and  Sundaresan  debt-equity  swap.  The  absolute  errors  in  prices,  yields  and  spreads  are 
calculated as the predicted prices, yields and spreads minus the observed values of these variables. 
The relative errors are computed as the absolute errors divided by the observed prices, yields or 
spreads. 
 
Figure 1 – Distribution of Relative Pricing Errors 









Figure 2 – Fan and Sundaresan Debt-Equity Swap: Sensitivity of Bankruptcy Threshold, 











We report the predicted mean values for bankruptcy threshold, debt, equity and firm 
value, using the calibration procedure that estimates simultaneously the unlevered firm 
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